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Abstract:
Modern statistical software and machine learning libraries are enabling
semi-automated statistical inference. Within this context, it appears eas-
ier and easier to try and fit many models to the data at hand, reversing
thereby the Fisherian way of conducting science by collecting data after
the scientific hypothesis (and hence the model) has been determined. The
renewed goal of the statistician becomes to help the practitioner choose
within such large and heterogeneous families of models, a task known as
model selection. The Bayesian paradigm offers a systematized way of as-
sessing this problem. This approach, launched by Harold Jeffreys in his
1935 book Theory of Probability, has witnessed a remarkable evolution
in the last decades, that has brought about several new theoretical and
methodological advances. Some of these recent developments are the focus
of this survey, which tries to present a unifying perspective on work carried
out by different communities. In particular, we focus on non-asymptotic
out-of-sample performance of Bayesian model selection and averaging tech-
niques, and draw connections with penalized maximum likelihood. We also
describe recent extensions to wider classes of probabilistic frameworks in-
cluding high-dimensional, unidentifiable, or likelihood-free models.
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1. Introduction: collecting data, fitting many models
Today, the conventional statistical process embodied by Fisher’s (1938) famous
exhortation
To consult the statistician after an experiment is finished is often merely to
ask him to conduct a post mortem examination. He can perhaps say what the
experiment died of.
has been somewhat reversed. Indeed, as illustrated e.g. by Giraud (2014, Chap-
ter 1) or by Cox et al. (2018), modern scientific research often involves the si-
multaneous measurement of a large number of (potentially irrelevant) variables
before statistical practice is actually set in motion. Rather than falsifying or cor-
roborating predetermined hypotheses, researchers mine these high-dimensional
data using a vast toolbox of statistical models. This new scientific practice—
caricatured by the motto collect data first, ask questions later—was notably
powered by the recent rise of automatic statistical software, illustrated for ex-
ample by the growing popularity of Edward (Tran et al., 2016), JASP (Wagen-
makers et al., 2018), PyMC (Salvatier et al., 2016), or Stan (Carpenter et al.,
2016).
In this new context, it appears of paramount importance to be able to com-
pare and assess the relevance and the performance of these many models, and to
identify the best ones. Bayesian model uncertainty provides a systematized way
of answering some of these questions. This approach, whose history is briefly
summarized in the next section, has witnessed a remarkable evolution in the last
decades, that has brought about several new theoretical and methodological ad-
vances. The foundations of Bayesian model uncertainty, as well as some of these
recent developments are the subject of this review paper. In particular we focus
on new perspectives on the out-of-sample properties of Bayesian model selection
and averaging. We also review computational advances that enable practitioners
to assess model uncertainty in three challenging families of modern statistical
models: singular, high-dimensional, and likelihood-free models.
2. A brief history of Bayesian model uncertainty
Bayesian model uncertainty is essentially founded on the idea of spreading prior
beliefs between competing models, implying that the marginal distribution of
the data follows a mixture of all model-specific marginals. This paradigm was
initially developed by Sir Harold Jeffreys and Dorothy Wrinch in a series of pa-
pers (Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1919, 1921, 1923), culminating with Jeffreys’s book
Theory of Probability (1939). For a recent perspective on the place of Bayesian
model uncertainty in Theory of Probability, see Robert et al. (2009). It is worth
mentioning that Jeffreys considered it an essential piece of his scientific work.
Indeed, in a 1983 interview with Dennis Lindley quoted by Etz and Wagenmak-
ers (2017), Jeffreys stated that he thought that his most important contribution
to probability and statistics was “the idea of a significance test (...) putting half
the probability into a constant being 0, and distributing the other half over a
range of possible values”.
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Independently, similar ideas were developed by J. B. S. Haldane (1932), as
recently exhibited by Etz and Wagenmakers (2017), and also by Alan Turing,
who designed related tests to decrypt Enigma codes during World War II, as
testified by Turing’s main statistical collaborator I. J. Good (1979).
This scientific paradigm gained considerable popularity in the beginning of
the 1990s, in particular with David MacKay’s (1991) thesis which had a sig-
nificant impact on the then-burgeoning machine learning community, and with
the review paper of Robert Kass and Adrian Raftery (1995), which quickly
disseminated Jeffreys’s ideas to the whole scientific community.
3. The foundations of Bayesian model uncertainty
In this section, we present the Bayesian framework of model uncertainty, essen-
tially founded by Jeffreys in his book Theory of Probability (1939). We start
with some data D living in a probability space and with a familyM1, ...,Mdmax
of candidate statistical models. Unless specified otherwise, these models corre-
spond to parametric families (indexed by Θ1, ...,Θdmax) of probability measures
over the data space, which are absolutely continuous with respect to a reference
measure (usually the Lebesgue or the counting measure).
3.1. Handling model uncertainty with Bayes’s theorem
The Bayesian framework may be summarized in a single sentence: model un-
known quantities as random variables in order to assess their uncertain nature.
Under model uncertainty, there are two different kinds of unknowns: models
and their parameters. We assume therefore that priors p(Md) and p(θ|Md)
over these unknowns are specified. As in Draper (1995), we may summarize this
framework by contemplating what we will call the expanded model
MExp :
 Md ∼ p(·)θ ∼ p(·|Md)D ∼ p(·|θ,Md). (1)
A way of interpreting this three-stage hierarchical model is to see the global
prior distribution (over both models and parameters) as a way of sampling
distributions p(·|θ,Md) over the data space. In this very general framework,
it is actually not necessary to assume that the model family is finite, or even
countable. Draper (1995) advocates for example the use of a continuous model
family to gain flexibility, and shows several applications (see also Gelman et al.,
2014, Chapter 7). Note that the resulting marginal distribution of the data is a
mixture model (an infinite one in the case of an infinite model family).
Now that we have specified the probabilistic architecture, model uncertainty
will be tackled automatically by the Bayesian machinery. Indeed, from Bayes’s
theorem, we obtain posterior probabilities of models as, for all d ∈ {1, ..., dmax},
p(Md|D) ∝ p(D|Md)p(Md),
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where
p(D|Md) =
∫
Θd
p(D|θ,Md)p(θ|Md)dθ (2)
is the marginal likelihood of modelMd—also called evidence (see e.g. MacKay,
2003), type II likelihood (see e.g. Berger, 1985), or integrated likelihood (see
e.g. Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). This quantity, which may be interpreted as
the prior mean of the likelihood function, will play a central role in Bayesian
model uncertainty. Besides computing posterior model probabilities, that have
an intuitive interpretation for assessing model uncertainty within the family at
hand (see Section 3.2), it is also useful to conduct pairwise model comparisons
between two models, sayMd andMd′ . This can be done using the posterior odds
againstMd′
p(Md|D)
p(Md′ |D) =
p(D|Md)
p(D|Md′)
p(Md)
p(Md′) . (3)
Posterior odds involve two terms: the prior odds p(Md)/p(Md′) which only
depend on the prior distribution over the family of models, and the ratio of
marginal likelihoods,
BFd/d′ =
p(D|Md)
p(D|Md′) , (4)
called the Bayes factor—a term partly coined by Alan Turing during World
War II, who called it the “factor” (Good, 1979). The main appeal of the Bayes
factor is that, regardless of prior probabilities of models, it provides a good
summary of the relative support for Md against Md provided by the data.
Although extremely convenient, this simple interpretation has been subject to
much debate (see Section 3.2).
Now that we have a posterior distribution over the family of models, how can
we make use of this knowledge of model uncertainty to take decisions?
The first answer is Bayesian model selection: settling for the model with the
largest posterior probability, leading to the choice
d∗ ∈ argmaxd∈{1,...,dmax}p(Md|D). (5)
This offers a systematized way of choosing a single model within the family, and
can be seen as an instance of hypothesis testing. It is worth mentioning that
Bayesian model selection was originally described by Jeffreys as an alternative
to classical hypothesis tests. For perspectives on the links between the different
approaches of testing, see Berger (2003).
However, when no model truly stands out, it is often better to combine all
models (or some of the bests) to grasp more fully the complexity of the data.
There comes the second important Bayesian approach of model uncertainty:
Bayesian model averaging (BMA). BMA allows to borrow strength from all
models to conduct better predictions. Specifically, assume that we are interested
in a quantity ∆, that has the same meaning in all models. This quantity can
be a value that we wish to predict (like the temperature of the Pacific ocean
using several forecasting models, as in Raftery et al., 2005), or a parameter that
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appears in all models (like the coefficient of a linear regression model). For a
more detailed discussion on what it means to have “the same meaning in all
models”, see the discussion of Draper (1999) and the rejoinder of the excellent
BMA tutorial of Hoeting et al. (1999). The BMA posterior distribution of ∆
will be its posterior distribution withinMExp,
p(∆|D) =
dmax∑
d=1
p(∆|Md,D)p(Md|D), (6)
which corresponds to a mixture of all model-specific posteriors. Taking the mean
of the BMA posterior gives a natural point estimate for predicting the value of
∆,
∆ˆ = E∆(∆|D) =
dmax∑
d=1
E∆(∆|Md,D)p(Md|D). (7)
Sometimes, the average may not be conducted over all models, but solely over
a smaller subfamily, as in Madigan’s and Raftery’s (1994) Occam’s window.
These two popular techniques, which will constitute our main focus, can be
embedded within a larger decision theoretic framework. In this context, Bayesian
model selection corresponds to the 0-1 loss and BMA corresponds to the squared
loss (see e.g. Bernardo and Smith, 1994, Section 6.1 or Clyde and George, 2004,
Section 6).
3.2. Interpretations of Bayesian model uncertainty
3.2.1. Interpretation of posterior model probabilities
Contrarily to other techniques that tackle the model uncertainty problem, the
Bayesian approach produces easily interpretable results. Indeed, posterior model
probabilities are readily understandable, even by non-statisticians, because of
their intuitive nature. But what is their precise meaning? Formally, for each
d ∈ {1, ..., dmax}, the quantity p(Md|D) is the probability thatMd is true given
the data, given that we accept the prior distributions over models and their
parameters, and given that one of the models at hand is actually true. There
are several points of this statement that need further description. First, the
controversial question of the relevance of the chosen priors raises many con-
cerns, as described in Section 3.3.2. Second, the assumption that one of the
models is actually true is often problematic. Indeed, in most applied cases, it
appears overoptimistic to assume that the true data-generating model is con-
tained within the tested family. In particular, in problems coming from social
sciences or psychology, it seems clear that the true data-generating mechanism
is likely to be beyond the reach of scientists (see e.g. Gelman and Shalizi, 2013).
However, reasoning from the perspective that one of the models is true may re-
main scientifically valid on several grounds. Indeed, most scientific inference is
made conditionally on models (models that are usually known to be false) in or-
der to actually conduct science—a striking example is that the notoriously false
Newtonian mechanics still flourish today, because it provides a scientifically con-
venient framework. Rather than conditioning on a single model, Bayesian model
uncertainty conditions on a set of models. This is perhaps as wrong as condition-
ing on a single model, but it certainly is more useful. Conditioning a scientific
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process on a wrong hypothesis is indeed acceptable as long as this hypothesis is
powerful or useful. Or, as famously explained by Box (1979),
The law PV = RT relating pressure P , volume V and temperature T of an
“ideal” gas via a constant R is not exactly true for any real gas, but it frequently
provides a useful approximation and furthermore its structure is informative
since it springs from a physical view of the behavior of gas molecules. For such
a model there is no need to ask the question “Is the model true?”. If “truth” is
to be the “whole truth” the answer must be “No”. The only question of interest
is “Is the model illuminating and useful?”.
Therefore, the (significantly less formal) interpretation of posterior model prob-
abilities that we will adopt is that p(Md|D) is the probability that Md is the
most useful model within the family at hand. Actually, a formalization of this
interpretation (which gives a precise predictive sense to the “usefulness” of a
model) in the case where the true model is out of hand—this situation is of-
ten referred to as the M-open scenario, as defined by Bernardo and Smith
(1994, Section 6.1.2)—was provided by Dawid’s (1984) prequential (predictive
sequential) analysis. For discussions on prequential analysis and related pre-
dictive interpretations, see also Kass and Raftery (1995, Section 3.2), Gneiting
and Raftery (2007, Section 7.1) and Vehtari and Ojanen (2012, Section 5.6).
Similarly, Germain et al. (2016) gave a new and theoretically grounded predic-
tive foundation of Bayesian model uncertainty which gives more support to the
interpretation that we advocate here. We present a detailed overview of this
approach in Section 3.4.
3.2.2. Interpretation of Bayes factors
A key asset of Bayes factors is that, contrarily to posterior model probabilities,
they do not depend on prior model probabilities (which are often arbitrary).
However, this independence comes at the price of a more controversial inter-
pretability. Since the Bayes factor is equal to the ratio of posterior odds to prior
odds, it appears natural to consider it as the quantification of the evidence pro-
vided by the data in favor of a model—or, as Good (1952) called it, the weight
of evidence. This interpretation, which dates back to Jeffreys and Wrinch, was
advocated notably by Berger (1985, Section 4.3.3) and Kass and Raftery (1995).
This interpretation was criticized by Lavine and Schervish (1999), who showed
that, rather than seeing a Bayes factor as a measure of support, it was more
sensible to interpret it as a measure of the change of support brought about by
the data. In their words,
What the Bayes factor actually measures is the change in the odds in favor of
the hypothesis when going from the prior to the posterior.
In a similar fashion, Lindley (1997) warned against the use of Bayes factors, and
suggested to rather use posterior odds.
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3.3. Specifying prior distributions
3.3.1. Model prior probabilities: non-informative priors and the simplicity
postulate
When there is little prior information about the plausibility of different models,
it is reasonable to follow Keynes’s (1921, Chapter 4) principle of indifference
and to choose the uniform prior over models p(Md) ∝ 1. In this setting, using
posterior model probabilities will be equivalent to using Bayes factors. However,
it is often appropriate to seek more sensible priors that translate some form of
prior knowledge. For example, in variable selection problems that involve a very
large number of variables (e.g. 10.000 genes), it appears reasonable to give a
higher prior probabilities to models that involve only a moderate amount of
variables (e.g. preferring a priori a model that involve 100 genes over one that
involves 10.000). For examples of similar approaches, see Narisetty and He (2014)
or Yang et al. (2016). Actually, this rationale was already advocated by Jeffreys
(1961, p. 46):
All we have to say is that the simpler laws have the greater prior probabilities.
This is what Wrinch and I called the simplicity postulate.
This simplicity postulate is linked to a philosophic principle known as Occam’s
razor, named after the 14th century philosopher and theologian William of Oc-
cam. Occam’s razor essentially states that, in the absence of strong evidence
against it, a simpler hypothesis should be preferred to a more complex one. Ac-
tually, Bayesian model uncertainty involves two Occam’s razors. The first one
is precisely the simplicity postulate, and the second one is the fact that, when
two models explain the data equally well, the simplest one has a larger marginal
likelihood (see Section 3.5).
3.3.2. Parameter prior probabilities and the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox
In Bayesian parameter inference, the influence of the prior distribution tends to
disappear in the long run (when the number of observations tends to infinity).
A formalization of this argument is the celebrated Bernstein-von Mises theorem
(see e.g. Van der Vaart, 2000, Chapter 10). This phenomenon is less present
when tackling model uncertainty, and poorly chosen prior distributions may
lead to disastrous results even in the asymptotic regime. A famous instance
of this problem is the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox, which essentially states that
using improper or very diffuse prior distributions for parameters will lead to
selecting the simplest model, regardless of the data. Popularized by Lindley
(1957), this paradox had already been pointed out by Jeffreys (1939). It is also
known as the Bartlett paradox because of Bartlett’s (1957) early insight on it.
For more details, see Spanos (2013) or Robert (2014) on the epistemological
side, and Robert (1993) or Villa and Walker (2017) on the technical side. The
main concern about this paradox is that diffuse priors are often chosen as default
priors because of their objective nature. Thus, some particular care has to be
taken when specifying priors in the presence of model uncertainty. While the
use of improper or diffuse priors is generally proscribed for model selection
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purposes, several approaches have been proposed to bypass this problem. A
first simple instance where improper priors may be acceptable is the case where
a parameter appears in all models, like the intercept or the noise variance of a
linear regression model (see e.g. Marin and Robert, 2014, pp. 44, 82). Another
option is to use some form of resampling. First, perform Bayesian inference
on a subset of the data using a (potentially improper) prior distribution, then
use the obtained posterior as a prior for the rest of the data. This idea is the
foundation of the fractional Bayes factors of O’Hagan (1995) and the intrinsic
Bayes factors of Berger and Pericchi (1996). These techniques share the usual
drawbacks of subsampling methods: they are computationally intensive and are
inadequate when the number of observations is small. As recently suggested by
Dawid and Musio (2015) and Shao et al. (2018), replacing the likelihood by
another scoring rule can also alleviate the dangers of working with improper
priors.
Since using improper or diffuse priors is difficult in model uncertainty con-
texts, it appears necessary to use methods that allow to choose proper priors.
Many ways of specifying such priors exist (see e.g. Bayarri and Berger, 2013,
Section 18.6 for several examples). Among them, an interesting and controversial
approach is to leverage the empirical Bayes technique. For each model, usually
empirical Bayes considers a parametric family of priors (p(θ|Md, η))η∈Ed and
treat η as a frequentist parameter to be estimated by the data. Usually, η is
estimated by maximum marginal likelihood
ηˆ ∈ argmaxη∈Ed log p(D|Md, η), (8)
but other estimation procedures (like the method of moments) can be used. The
prior p(θ|Md, ηˆ) is eventually chosen. While choosing such a data-dependent
prior might be disconcerting, it can be seen as an approximation to a fully
Bayesian approach that would use a prior distribution for η (MacKay, 1994,
Section 6.3). Moreover, it leads to very good empirical and theoretical perfor-
mances in several contexts, such as linear regression (Cui and George, 2008;
Liang et al., 2008; Latouche et al., 2016) or principal component analysis (Bou-
veyron et al., 2018). In a sense, the empirical Bayes maximization problem is
equivalent to performing continuous model selection by contemplating Ed as the
model space. It is sometimes possible to avoid performing maximum marginal
likelihood for each model by averaging over all models: this technique is referred
to as glocal empirical Bayes (Liang et al., 2008).
Example: the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for predicting ozone concen-
tration Considering the Ozone data set of Chambers et al. (1983), we wish
to predict daily ozone concentration in New York city using three explanatory
variables: wind speed, maximum temperature, and solar radiation. For this pur-
pose, we use linear regression with Zellner’s (1986) g prior. As usual in a variable
selection framework, we index the model space using a binary vector v ∈ {0, 1}3
which indicates which variables are deemed relevant in model Mv. We denote
by Y the vector of observed concentrations, and by X the matrix of explanatory
Mattei/Bayesian Model Uncertainty 9
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Fig 1. The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for linear regression with g-priors for the Ozone data
set. As g becomes very large, the prior distribution of the regression vector becomes less and
less informative, leading to the progressive dismissal of all three explanatory variables. Three
proposals of automatic determination of g are also displayed: global empirical Bayes (GEB),
risk information criterion (RIC) and unit information prior (UIP, see e.g. Liang et al., 2008,
for more details on these three techniques).
variables. There are #{0, 1}3 = 8 models, defined by
Mv : Y = µ1p +Xvβv + ε, (9)
where ε ∼ N (0, φ−1In). As in Liang et al. (2008), we consider the following
prior distributions:
p(Mv) ∝ 1, p(µ, φ|Mv) ∝ 1
φ
, and βv|φ,Mv ∼ N
(
0,
g
φ
(XTX)−1
)
. (10)
The prior distribution of µ and φ is improper, but this is acceptable because
both parameters appear in all models (which is not the case for βv). When g
becomes large, the prior distribution of βv becomes very flat, and the Jeffreys-
Lindley paradox comes into play. To get a grasp of this phenomenon, we may
look at the posterior inclusion probabilities for all three variables, defined as
the posterior probability that the corresponding coefficient is nonzero (Figure
1). When g is very large, Bayesian model uncertainty suggests that all three
variables are useless. Three popular ways of automatically choosing g are also
displayed. As we can see, using any of these reasonable choices allows to get
very far from the Jeffreys-Lindley regime.
While we separated here for clarity the problems of finding priors over model
space and parameters, it is worth mentioning that several interesting works con-
sidered the simultaneous specification of these priors (Dawid, 2011; Dellaportas
et al., 2012). Let us finish this subsection by quoting Jordan (2011), then presi-
dent of the International Society for Bayesian Analysis, summarizing a survey he
conducted across several senior statisticians regarding important open problems
in Bayesian statistics,
Many people feel that prior specification for model selection is still wide open.
Mattei/Bayesian Model Uncertainty 10
3.4. Theoretical guarantees of Bayesian model uncertainty
Theoretical guarantees of model selection schemes can fall within several frame-
works. The two main criteria at play are usually the modeling assumptions (is
there a “true model” or not?) and the nature of the guarantees (asymptotic or
not? predictive of explanatory?).
3.4.1. Is finding a “true model” desirable?
In most practical cases, it appears unrealistic to assume that one model within
the available family did actually generate the data. However, this assumption
is commonly made when statisticians assess the performance of a model se-
lection scheme. A reason for this is that, in the (overly optimistic) framework
where there actually were a true model, we would want a good model selection
technique to find it. Or, to quote Liang et al. (2008),
While agreeing that no model is ever completely true, many (ourselves included)
do feel it is useful to study the behavior of procedures under the assumption of
a true model.
This “good behavior in the best case scenario” framework is sometimes consid-
ered pointless as this “best case scenario” is too unrealistic (see e.g. Gelman and
Shalizi, 2013, or Spiegelhalter et al., 2014). Although we believe that the true
model assumption can be of interest, we will not focus on theoretical results
that rely on it in this section.
Note however that, sometimes, the true model assumption can be valid.
This is for example the case in physics, for example if one wants to choose
between Newtonian gravitation or Einstein’s general relativity (Jefferys and
Berger, 1992).
3.4.2. Asymptotics
Traditionally, theoretical model selection guarantees aim at ensuring that, in
the long run (when n goes to infinity), the studied technique gives a high prob-
ability to the best model. If there is no true model, the closest model in the
Kullback-Leibler sense if often considered. This property is usually called model
selection consistency. For recent perspectives on the subject, we defer the reader
to Liang et al. (2008) regarding linear regression, Chatterjee et al. (2017) for
non independent data, and Walker (2004), Dawid (2011) and Chib and Kuffner
(2016) for broad reviews. An interestingly growing point of view is the high-
dimensional scenario where it is assumed that both the number of variables and
the number of observations grow to infinity (see e.g. Moreno et al., 2015, Barber
et al., 2016).
3.4.3. Out-of-sample performance
In this review, while acknowledging the usefulness of both asymptotics and the
true model assumption, we wish to focus on the recent findings of Germain
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et al. (2016), which insure that Bayesian model selection allows to find optimal
models from a predictive perspective, even in non-asymptotic settings and when
the true model is not in the family.
Germain et al. (2016) established an important bridge between the (es-
sentially frequentist) PAC-Bayesian theory and Bayesian model selection. The
PAC-Bayesian theory, introduced by Shawe-Taylor and Williamson (1997) and
McAllester (1998) and championed by Catoni (2007), aims at finding non-
asymptotic probably approximately correct (PAC) bounds on the generalization
error of a machine learning algorithm. As we will see, the PAC-Bayesian ma-
chinery also allows to find bounds on the predictive log-likelihood (that is, the
likelihood of new, unseen data) of a Bayesian model.
In the following, we consider a supervised setting where we are dealing with
n i.i.d. copies D = (X,Y ) = (xi, yi)i≤n ∈ (X × Y)n of a random variable
(x, y) ∼ pdata. Since it is not assumed that the data-generating model lies within
the family, prior model probabilities are assumed to be chosen as scores of prior
usefulness of the models, and posterior model probabilities cannot eventually be
seen as probabilities that the models are true (see Section 3.2). The predictive
log-likelihood function, defined for a given modelMd as, for all θ ∈ Θd,
L(θ|Md) = Ex,y[log p(y|x, θ,Md)], (11)
will be the quantity of interest, as it allows to asses the out-of-sample per-
formance of a model. We will also look at the BMA predictive log-likelihood,
defined as, for all (θ1, ..., θdmax) ∈ Θ1 × ...×Θdmax ,
LBMA(θ1, ..., θdmax) =
dmax∑
d=1
p(Md|X,Y )Ex,y[log p(y|x, θd,Md)]. (12)
Although we will not assume that pdata lies within the model family, we need
to make assumptions on this distribution in order to bound the predictive likeli-
hood. Following, Germain et al. (2016), we will rely on the following sub-gamma
assumption stated below. For more details on sub-gamma random variables, see
e.g. Boucheron et al. (2013, Section 2.4).
Definition 1 (Sub-gamma assumption). A Bayesian model (p(·|θ)θ∈Θ, pi) of
some data D coming from a distribution pdata satisfies the sub-gamma assump-
tion with variance factor s2 > 0 and scale parameter c > 0 if the random vari-
able log p(D|θ)−ED log p(D|θ) is a sub-gamma random variable, that is that its
moment generating function is upper bounded by the one of a Gamma random
variable with shape parameter s2/c2 and scale parameter c.
The validity of the sub-gamma assumption, deeply linked to the theory of
concentration inequalities, depends on the true distribution of the data. How-
ever, it is not necessary to assume that this true distribution belongs to the
model family. Knowing which models satisfy this assumption is of paramount
importance, and should be the subject of future work. Germain et al. (2016)
showed that the linear regression model, for example, satisfies the sub-gamma
assumption.
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We can now provide out-of-sample guarantees for Bayesian inference under
model uncertainty.
Theorem 1 (Germain et al., 2016, Corollary 6). If the expanded model satisfies
the sub-gamma assumption with variance s2 > 0 and scale c > 0, we have, with
probability at least 1− 2δ over the data-generating distribution,
Eθ1,...,θdmax [LBMA(θ1, ..., θdmax)|D] ≥
1
n
log
(
dmax∑
d=1
p(Y |X,Md)p(Md)δ
)
− s
2
2(1− c) ,
(13)
and, for each d ∈ {1, ..., dmax},
Eθ[L(θ|Md)|D] ≥ 1
n
log (p(Y |X,Md)p(Md)δ)− s
2
2(1− c) . (14)
This theorem has two important non-asymptotic implications.
• Among the family at hand, the model with the largest marginal likelihood is
the one endowed with the strongest PAC guarantees. This gives strong the-
oretical support for the predictive empirical successes of Bayesian model
selection, especially in small-sample scenarios (MacKay, 1992b; Murphy
et al., 2010; Celeux et al., 2012).
• Since the bound obtained using the BMA posterior is tighter, BMA has
stronger PAC guarantees than the best model of the family. Again, this ex-
plains the well-established empirical result that BMA outperforms model
selection from a predictive perspective (Hoeting et al., 1999; Raftery et al.,
1996, 2005; Piironen and Vehtari, 2016). Note that several results on the
superiority of BMA have been presented in the past, but usually relied on
the fact that the quantity of interest was actually distributed according
to the BMA posterior (Raftery and Zheng, 2003).
The BMA bound offers guarantees regarding the model averaged log-likelihood.
However, in a forecasting context, it is often seen as more relevant to look at
the logarithm of the BMA posterior of the response p(y|x,D), as defined in
(6). Indeed, this criterion corresponds to the logarithmic score of Good (1952),
a strictly proper scoring rule widely used to assess the quality of probabilistic
forecasts (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). Using Jensen’s inequality, this quantity
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can be bounded directly using (13):
Ex,y[log p(y|x,D)] = Ex,y
[
log
(
dmax∑
d=1
p(Md|X,Y )Eθd [p(y|x, θd,Md)|D]
)]
≥ Ex,y
[
dmax∑
d=1
p(Md|X,Y ) logEθd [p(y|x, θd,Md)|D]
]
≥ Ex,y
[
dmax∑
d=1
p(Md|X,Y )Eθd [log p(y|x, θd,Md)]
]
≥ Eθ1,...,θdmax [LBMA(θ1, ..., θdmax)|D].
This gives a new interpretation to the results of Germain et al. (2016). If we
compare all models and BMA using the logarithmic scoring rule, then BMA
predictions have stronger guarantees than the model with the largest posterior
probability, which has itself stronger guarantees than all other models within
the family—a related result was obtained by Madigan and Raftery (1994) under
the strong assumption that y|x exactly follows the BMA posterior. Note that
these guarantees do not imply that BMA is the best way to aggregate mod-
els in a predictive perspective. Other aggregations techniques will sometimes
outperform BMA, as illustrated by Yao et al. (2018).
What about point estimation? This PAC theorem gives guarantees on
the posterior expectation of the predictive log-likelihood. However, it is often
of interest to have guarantees about point estimates of θ. For each model d ∈
{1, ..., dmax}, let us consider the posterior mean θˆd = Eθ[θ|D,Md], a popular
Bayesian point estimate, notably because of its decision theoretic optimality
under the squared loss (Berger, 1985, Section 2.2.4). If we assume that the log-
likelihood function is a concave function of θ, Jensen’s inequality implies that
Ex,y[log p(y|x, θˆd,Md)] ≥ Eθ,x,y[log p(y|x, θ,Md)|D], (15)
which means that the predictive likelihood evaluated at θˆd will inherit the good
PAC properties of the posterior predictive likelihood bounded in (14). Similarly,
BMA forecasts obtained with point estimates satisfy
Ex,y
[
log
(
dmax∑
d=1
p(y|x, θˆd,Md)p(Md|D)
)]
≥ LBMA(θˆ1, ..., θˆdmax) (16)
≥ Eθ1,...,θdmax [LBMA(θ1, ..., θdmax)|D].
(17)
This theorem offers some strong theoretical insight on why Bayesian model
uncertainty works well in a predictive setting, especially in small-sample scenar-
ios. However, one could argue that its merit is merely conceptual. Indeed, the
fact that the bounds depend on the data-generating distribution makes them
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very hard to compute in practice. A good sanity check that was conducted by
Germain et al. (2016) is to assess the tightness of the bound for some known
model. Specifically, they considered the linear regression model (which is sub-
gamma for some known scale and variance parameters) and observed that the
bound was indeed tight.
Actually, Theorem 1 also has some important practical applications. Indeed,
although the bounds themselves depend on unknown sub-gamma parameters,
the differences between bounds associated with different models can be computed
according to their posterior odds. Indeed, the difference between bounds associ-
ated with modelsMd andMd′ is exactly
1
n
log
(
p(Md|D)
p(Md′ |D)
)
.
In case of a uniform prior probabilities over models, the difference is n−1 logBFd/d′ .
This gives a new, predictive, interpretation of the Bayes factors as a measure
of evidence in favor of a model. If all bounds are tight, this also gives a good
estimate of the generalization gain proposed by a certain model.
An important consequence of this is that it provides a way to quantify the
benefits of BMA over model selection. In the discussion on the BMA tuto-
rial of Hoeting et al. (1999), Draper (1999) asked “what characteristics of a
statistical example predict when BMA will lead to large gains?”. While sug-
gesting to perform BMA when the ratio n/p is small, Draper (1999) insisted
on the need of more refined simple rules that will quantify the relevance of
performing BMA over model selection. Such a rule can be derived using the
PAC bounds. Indeed, the difference between the PAC bound of the BMA pos-
terior and the one of the model with the largest marginal likelihood is exactly
−(1/n) maxd log p(Y |X,Md) which means that the benefits of averaging will be
less important when the posterior probability of the best model is close to one.
While this consideration is unsurprising, another more important consequence
is that −(1/n) maxd log p(Y |X,Md) can be seen as a good estimate of the pre-
dictive likelihood gain of performing model averaging. This estimate indicates
that, when n is large, model averaging is likely to offer little to no gain over
model selection, which can lead to poor results if all models are far away from
the data generating mechanism (see e.g. Yao et al., 2018 for perspectives on this
phenomenon).
Example: how useful is averaging for linear regression? Consider the
Gaussian linear regression model. The usual performance criterion is the mean
squared prediction error (MSE), of which the likelihood is the simple affine
transformation log(2piσ)−1/(2σ2)MSE. According to the PAC bounds, a rough
estimate of the out-of-sample mean squared error difference between the pre-
dictions of the highest probability model and the model averaged ones can be
given by
MSE(model selection)−MSE(BMA) ≈ −(2σˆ2/n) max
d∈{1,...,dmax}
log p(Y |X,Md)
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Fig 2. Estimating the BMA gain for 20 linear regression data sets described in Appendix
A. Estimate obtained from the PAC bounds versus actual out-of-sample MSE gain obtained
with model averaging. Results are averaged over 500 random replications with balanced train-
ing/test splits. The identity line, plotted in red, represent the average of what we would get if
all data sets satisfied the sub-gamma assumption. Except for the Oil data set, the PAC bounds
give a rough but decent estimate of the actual out-of-sample performance. This indicates that,
for most of these data sets, the sub-gamma assumption appears quite reasonable. Fitting a
robust linear regression model to the 20 data points leads to an estimated slope of 1.54, and
an estimated intercept of −8.86.10−4. Ignoring the Oil data set leads to a slope of 1.11 and an
intercept of 1.35.10−4, which is very close to the value suggested by PAC theory (unit slope
with no intercept).
where σˆ is an estimate of the residual standard error. We assess the accuracy
of this estimate using five standard linear regression data sets (Figure 2) and
the hyper-g-n priors of Liang et al. (2008). Interestingly, this rough estimate
consistently gives a pretty good idea of the gain of performing BMA, and can
be seen as a good indicator of whether or not BMA can be useful.
3.5. Links with penalized model selection
Both Bayesian and penalty-based approaches build on the likelihood function to
perform model selection: while the former integrates it, the latter maximizes it
and adds a penalty. It appears natural to seek foundational connections between
these two likelihood treatments.
Kullback-Leibler penalization A simple penalized view of Bayesian model
selection can be derived as follows. For some modelMd associated to a param-
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eter space Θd, let us rewrite the log-marginal likelihood as
log p(D|Md) = p(D|Md)
p(D|Md) log p(D|Md) (18)
=
∫
Θd
p(D|θ,Md)p(θ|Md)
p(D|Md) log p(D|Md)dθ (19)
=
∫
Θd
p(θ|D,Md)
(
log p(θ|D,Md) + log p(θ|Md)
p(θ|D,Md)
)
dθ (20)
= Eθ[log p(D|θ,Md)|D]−KL(p(·|Md,D)||p(·|Md)). (21)
This means that maximizing the marginal likelihood can be seen as maximiz-
ing a penalized version of the posterior mean of the log-likelihood. The penalty
term is simply the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the prior and the pos-
terior, and will arguably penalize complex models in a finer way than penalties
based on the number of parameters (Seeger, 2003; Zhang, 2006). Interestingly,
this decomposition shows that choosing a too noninformative prior distribution
(such as a Gaussian with very large variance) will lead to an explosion of the
Kullback-Leibler term, and to overpenalizing the likelihood, thus choosing a
perhaps too simple model. This gives an interpretation of the Jeffreys-Lindley
paradox described in Section 3.3.2 as an overpenalization phenomenon. Similar
model selection schemes based on penalized versions of the posterior mean of the
likelihood Eθ[log p(D|θ,Md)|D] have been used in the past. Under the general
setting
score(D,Md) = Eθ[log p(D|θ,Md)|D]− pen(D,Md), (22)
we have the following correspondances:
• penPBF(D,M) = 0 corresponds to the posterior Bayes factors of Aitkin
(1991).
• penA&T(D,M) = np/2 corresponds to an estimator of the posterior pre-
dictive likelihood proposed by Ando and Tsay (2010). Note that Ando and
Tsay (2010) also proposed a refined criterion that falls within the general
setup of (22), but whose formula is much more complex.
• penDIC(D,M) = log p(D|θˆ,Md)/2, where θˆ is the posterior mean esti-
mate, is equivalent to the deviance information criterion (DIC) of Spiegel-
halter et al. (2002).
• penWAIC1(D,Md) = log(Eθ[p(D|θ,Md)|D])/2 and
penWAIC2(D,Md) = 2(log(Eθ[p(D|θ,Md)|D])− Eθ[log p(D|θ,Md)|D]))
are equivalent to two versions of the widely applicable information criterion
(WAIC) of Watanabe (2009, Section 8.3).
• the Bayesian predictive information criterion BPIC of Ando (2007) uses
a complex penalty penBPIC(D,M).
Several of these frameworks were specifically designed to estimate the posterior
mean of the predictive log-likelihood function, which is exactly the quantity
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bounded by the PAC theorem of Germain et al. (2016). Even though penBPIC
and penWAIC2 lead to asymptotically unbiased estimates of this quantity, the
Kullback-Leibler penalty automatically entangled with Bayesian model selec-
tion is, to the best of our knowledge, the only framework that provides strong
guarantees on small-sample behavior. For more insight on the merits of these
various penalization schemes, and their links with cross-validation, see Plummer
(2008).
Why is it necessary to penalize the posterior mean of the likelihood?
If we want to maximize the posterior predictive log likelihood, it seems natural
to maximize the posterior mean of the log likelihood, which can be seen as
an empirical estimate of our target. Similarly to the theory of empirical risk
minimization (see e.g. Alquier et al., 2018), it is customary to add a penalty to
this empirical estimate to avoid overfitting. From a Bayesian point of view, this
necessity can be interpreted as follows. When we compute the posterior mean
Eθ[log p(D|θ,Md)|D], (23)
we use the same data twice (to find the posterior distribution and to compute
the likelihood inside the expectation), which is not consistent with the Bayesian
approach. Aitkin (1991), who suggested an unpenalized use of the posterior
mean of the likelihood, was criticized by several of his discussants because of
this double use of the same data. As explained by Plummer (2008), the penalty
is what “must be paid for using the data (...) twice”.
MacKay’s Occam razor interpretation In his thesis and subsequent work,
MacKay (1991, 1992a, 2003), inspired by Gull (1988), drew interesting connec-
tions between penalized maximum likelihood methods and Bayesian model un-
certainty. The first step is to look at a Laplace approximation of the marginal
likelihood. For i.i.d. data, we have, under some (unfortunately not so mild)
regularity conditions that we discuss in Section (4.3.2)
log p(D|M) = log p(D|θˆ,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maximized likelihood
+ log p(θˆ|M) + p
2
log 2pi − 1
2
log detA+Op
(
1
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Occam factor
(24)
where θˆ is either the maximum a posteriori or the maximum-likelihood estima-
tor of θ (in the first case the p×p matrix A is the Hessian of the log posterior, in
the latter it is the observed information matrix). This means that, in the long
run, Bayesian model selection is approximatively equivalent to a form of au-
tomatically penalized maximum likelihood. This automatically designed penalty
was called the Occam factor by Gull (1988). It essentially depends on the prior
distribution and on the “complexity” of the model. In some simple scenarios
like linear regression, the Occam factor can directly be linked to the number of
parameters (see e.g. Latouche et al., 2016)—this builds a direct bridge with `0
penalization. However, it is not always the case and the Occam factor penalty
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provides a more sensible regularization than those based on the number of pa-
rameters (Rasmussen and Ghahramani, 2001). For a deeper interpretation of
the Occam factor penalty, see MacKay (2003, p. 349). Mackay’s other impor-
tant insight is a graphical interpretation of this Occam razor effect. Assume
for simplicity that there are only two models, one simple (M1) and one more
complex (M2). The key idea is to plot the marginal distributions of the data
p(D|Md) (seen as functions of D) using an idealized unidimensional D-axis
where “simple” data sets are located near the center of the plot (Figure 3). On
the one hand, the complex model will be able to provide good fits to a larger
range of data sets, and the corresponding marginal distribution p(D|Md) will
consequently be flatter. On the other hand, the simpler model will concentrate
its mass around a limited number of data sets, leading to a more peaky marginal
distribution. If the data comes from the C1 region of MacKay’s plot, then the
simpler model will have a larger evidence, even though it might not fit the data
as well. This illustrates the automatic “Occam’s razor effect” of Bayesian model
uncertainty. As described in Section 3.3.2, another Occam’s razor effect can be
added by following the simplicity postulate and giving more prior probability
to simpler models.
Example: MacKay’s plot for a single Gaussian observation We pro-
pose to plot a simple instance of MacKay’s plot (Figure 3). Consider the case
where the data consists in a single Gaussian observation x ∼ N (θ∗, 1) with unit
variance. We wish to know whether θ∗ = 0. The two models are
M1 : x ∼ N (0, 1),
and
M2 : x|θ ∼ N (θ, 1), θ ∼ N (0, s2),
leading to the marginal distributions
x|M1 ∼ N (0, 1) and x|M2 ∼ N (0, 1 + s2).
The more complex modelM2 will always provide a better fit to the data. But
if x is small enough, i.e. in the region
C1 =
[
−
(
1− 1
1 + s2
)
log(1 + s2),
(
1− 1
1 + s2
)
log(1 + s2)
]
, (25)
then the simpler zero-mean model will have a larger marginal likelihood. This il-
lustrates the Occam’s razor effect. Note that, when s goes to infinity, C1 becomes
infinitely wide, which means that p(D|M1) is everywhere above p(D|M2). In
this limiting case, the simpler model will always be preferred: once again, this
is an instance of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox (see Section 3.3.2). Another con-
crete example of MacKay’s plot was given (in a discrete setting) by Murray and
Ghahramani (2005).
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Fig 3. MacKay’s Occam razor plot. Left: MacKay’s idealized plot, reproduced from MacKay
(2003, p. 344). Right: MacKay’s plot for a single Gaussian observation.
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Figure 28.3. Why Bayesian
inference embodies Occam’s razor.
This figure gives the basic
intuition for why complex models
can turn out to be less probable.
The horizontal axis represents the
space of possible data sets D.
Bayes’ theorem rewards models in
proportion to how much they
predicted the data that occurred.
These predictions are quantified
by a normalized probability
distribution on D. This
probability of the data given
model Hi, P (D |Hi), is called the
evidence for Hi.
A simple model H1 makes only a
limited range of predictions,
shown by P (D |H1); a more
powerful model H2, that has, for
example, more free parameters
than H1, is able to predict a
greater variety of data sets. This
means, however, that H2 does not
predict the data sets in region C1
as strongly as H1. Suppose that
equal prior probabilities have been
assigned to the two models. Then,
if the data set falls in region C1,
the less powerful model H1 will be
the more probable model.
(Paul Dirac)); the second reason is the past empirical success of Occam’s razor.
However there is a different justification for Occam’s razor, namely:
Coherent inference (as embodied by Bayesian probability) auto-
matically embodies Occam’s razor, quantitatively.
It is indeed more probable that there’s one box behind the tree, and we can
compute how much more probable one is than two.
Model comparison and Occam’s razor
We evaluate the plausibility of two alternative theories H1 and H2 in the light
of data D as follows: using Bayes’ theorem, we relate the plausibility of model
H1 given the data, P (H1 |D), to the predictions made by the model about
the data, P (D |H1), and the prior plausibility of H1, P (H1). This gives the
following probability ratio between theory H1 and theory H2:
P (H1 |D)
P (H2 |D) =
P (H1)
P (H2)
P (D |H1)
P (D |H2) . (28.1)
The first ratio (P (H1)/P (H2)) on the right-hand side measures how much our
initial beliefs favoured H1 over H2. The second ratio expresses how well the
observed data were predicted by H1, compared to H2.
How does this relate to Occam’s razor, when H1 is a simpler model than
H2? The first ratio (P (H1)/P (H2)) gives us the opportunity, if we wish, to
insert a prior bias in favour of H1 on aesthetic grounds, or on the basis of
experience. This would correspond to the aesthetic and empirical motivations
for Occam’s razor mentioned earlier. But such a prior bias is not necessary:
the second ratio, the data-dependent factor, embodies Occam’s razor auto-
matically. Simple models tend to make precise predictions. Complex models,
by their nature, are capable of making a greater variety of predictions (figure
28.3). So if H2 is a more complex model, it must spread its predictive proba-
bility P (D |H2) more thinly over the data space than H1. Thus, in the case
where the data are compatible with both theories, the simplerH1 will turn out
more probable than H2, without our having to express any subjective dislike
for complex models. Our subjective prior just needs to assign equal prior prob-
abilities to the possibilities of simplicity and complexity. Probability theory
then allows the observed data to express their opinion.
Let us turn to a simple example. Here is a sequence of numbers:
−1, 3, 7, 11.
The task is to predict the next two numbers, and infer the underlying process
that gave rise to this sequence. A popular answer to this question is the
prediction ‘15, 19’, with the explanation ‘add 4 to the previous number’.
What about the alternative answer ‘−19.9, 1043.8’ with the underlying
rule being: ‘get the next number from the previous number, x, by evaluating
p(D|M1)
p(D|M2)
←−−−→C1
Evidence
4. Modern practice of Bayesian model uncertainty
In this section, we review some computational strategies that allow to set
Bayesian model uncertainty in motion.
4.1. Computing marg nal likelihoods
As explained in the previous section, the posterior probabilities of modelMd
can be computed using its marginal likelihood
p(D|Md) =
∫
Θd
p(D|θ,Md)p(θ|Md)dθ. (26)
This quantity is therefore of paramount importance to account for model uncer-
tainty. Unfortunately, as a potentially high-dimensional integral, it is often very
difficult to compute exactly. Several approximation schemes have been devel-
oped accordingly. However, closed-form calculation of the marginal likelihood is
sometimes feasible. While classical examples include multivariate Gaussian data
(see e.g. Murphy, 2007) or linear regression (see e.g. Bishop, 2007, Section 3.5.1,
or Marin and Robert, 2014, Section 3.4.3), more complex models have also been
tackled recently, such as factor analysis (Ando, 2009), mixtures of independence
models (Lin et al., 2009), two-sample nonparametric tests (Holmes et al., 2015),
and principal component analysis (Bouveyron et al., 2017, 2018).
4.2. Markov cha n Monte C rlo methods
Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC), the Swiss Army knife of modern
Bayesian nalysis, have been extens vely a ply to the calculation of marginal
likelihoods, posterior ds, or Bayes factor . In this subsection, we simply give
pointers o imp rtant milestones of an enormous body of work that falls beyond
the parsimonious scope of this review paper.
MCMC approaches to model uncertaint may be divided in two families of
techniques.
First, w thin-mode methods directly attack the marginal likelihoods of mod-
els u ing MCMC. These tec n ques include notably importance sampling and its
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variants—in particular Neal’s (2001) annealed importance sampling—, nested
sampling (Skilling, 2006), power posteriors (Friel and Pettitt, 2008), and schemes
based on the harmonic mean identity (see e.g. Weinberg, 2012, and references
herein). Interesting reviews devoted to this line of work are given by Robert and
Wraith (2009), Marin and Robert (2010), and Friel and Wyse (2012). A recent
important advance in that direction is the scheme of Grosse et al. (2015), who
obtained provable upper and lower bounds on the marginal likelihood when the
data generating process is known. This allows to evaluate formally the perfor-
mance of various within-model methods in complex scenarios (see Grosse et al.,
2015, for a few examples).
The other family of techniques is the one of transdimensional methods. Pio-
neered by Carlin and Chib (1995) and by Green’s (1995) reversible jump frame-
work, these approaches aim at obtaining samples from the posterior distribution
over both models and parameters. Good reviews are provided by Sisson (2005)
and Hastie and Green (2012). See also Hee et al. (2016) for recent perspectives.
For insightful comparisons between these two approaches, see Chen et al.
(2000), Han and Carlin (2001), and Clyde and George (2004, Section 5). A im-
portant issue with both approaches is their limited availability in high-dimensional
settings. Indeed, in these cases, the parameter space is too vast to be visited
properly and MCMC integration becomes more challenging.
4.3. A little help from asymptotics
Computing marginal likelihoods, either exactly or using MCMC, is challenging.
However, large-sample theory can also provide an interesting guide to build
marginal likelihood approximations.
4.3.1. The Laplace approximation and BIC
Recall the Laplace approximation of the marginal likelihood of Section 3.5:
log p(D|Md) = log p(D|θˆ,Md)+log p(θˆ|Md)+ dim Θd
2
log 2pi− 1
2
log detA+Op
(
1
n
)
,
(27)
where θˆ is either the maximum a posteriori or the maximum-likelihood estimator
of θ (in the first case the dim Θd×dim Θd matrix A is the Hessian of the log pos-
terior, in the latter it is the observed information matrix, evaluated at θˆ). When
this approximation is valid, a Op (1/n) approximation of the marginal likelihood
can be computed using simply the maximized likelihood and the observed in-
formation matrix. Actually, this rationale leads to even simpler approximations.
Indeed, approximating the observed information matrix by n times the Fisher
information matrix and dropping all the terms that are Op(1), we end up with
log p(D|Md) = log p(D|θˆ,Md)− dim Θd
2
log n+Op (1) . (28)
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The crude marginal likelihood proxy log p(D|θˆ,Md)− (dim Θd/2) log n involved
in equation (28) was first derived by Schwarz (1978) and extended by Haughton
(1988), who also proved that it produces a consistent model selection procedure.
From this approximation, an information criterion similar to AIC can be derived,
leading to the popular Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
BIC(D,Md) = −2 log p(D|θˆ,Md) + dim Θd log n. (29)
The BIC has the practical advantage that its off-the-shelf expression does not
involve the prior distribution whatsoever, at the price of producing a rough
Op(1) approximation of the marginal likelihood. However, the BIC actually cor-
responds to an implicit prior distribution. Indeed, assuming that the prior dis-
tribution of θ is a specific data-dependent prior, it is possible to show that
Schwarz’s proxy actually provides Op (1/
√
n) approximation of the marginal
likelihood (Kass and Wasserman, 1995; Raftery, 1995). This prior distribution,
called the unit information prior (UIP), can be interpreted as a weakly infor-
mative prior based on an imaginary sample of one observation. For discussions
on the merits and dangers of using the UIP or the BIC, see Weakliem (1999),
Raftery (1999), and Kuha (2004).
4.3.2. Towards singular asymptotics
We remained voluntarily laconic regarding the regularity conditions for the
Laplace approximation (27) to be valid. Several of them are of importance.
For thorough theoretical treatments of these conditions, see Haughton (1988)
and Kass et al. (1990). We choose here to give details on the conditions that are
the most often violated in practice.
First, it is assumed that θˆ is an interior point of Θd. This can be an important
issue in many cases (consider for instance a scale parameter, or g in a g-prior).
Several solutions have been proposed to efficiently tackle this issue (Erkanli,
1994; Hsiao, 1997; Pauler et al., 1999).
Moreover, it is assumed that the Fisher information matrix in invertible. This
condition is unfortunately violated in non-identifiable models, which are becom-
ing ubiquitous in statistical inference. Such models, often called singular models,
include mixture models, factor analysis, probabilistic principal component anal-
ysis, hidden Markov models, deep neural networks or reduced-rank regression.
In these cases, the Laplace approximation is invalid and more refined asymp-
totic theory has to be invoked. As first exhibited by Watanabe (1999), algebraic
geometry proves extremely useful in this context. Specifically, for a wide variety
of singular models, a BIC-like approximation was derived by Watanabe (2009,
Theorem 6.7),
log p(D|Md) = log p(D|θˆ,Md)− λd log n+ (md − 1) log log n+Op (1) , (30)
where λd is a positive rational number called the learning coefficient (also known
as the real log canonical threshold in the algebraic geometry literature) andmd is
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a natural number called the multiplicity of λd. For regular models, the learning
coefficient is simply equal to dim(Θd)/2 and its multiplicity is one, which means
that Watanabe’s result reduces to the BIC approximation. However, for singu-
lar models, the couple (λd,md) is an often difficult to compute quantity that
depends on the true data generating distribution. A major caveat is therefore
that, for (30) to be used, the true model (which is precisely what we are looking
for) has to be known beforehand. This would seems to lead to some inextricable
circular reasoning problem. To tackle this issue Watanabe (2013) proposed to
combine his BIC-like approximation with thermodynamic integration (see also
Friel et al., 2017). A fully deterministic solution was also provided by Drton and
Plummer (2017) who got around the circular reasoning problem by averaging
over different learning coefficients. They defined a singular Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (sBIC) as the solution of a well-posed fixed-point problem (Drton
and Plummer, 2017, Definition 1). This new criterion has several merits. First,
it is a deterministic and computationally cheap Op (1) approximation of the
marginal likelihood that reduces to the BIC when the model is regular, and is
still valid when the model is singular. For these reasons, it can be considered a
valid generalization of the BIC.
The singular Occam factor and the predictive power of singular mod-
els Generalizing MacKay’s Occam factor rationale described in (31) to sin-
gular models leads to the following asymptotic decomposition of the marginal
likelihood:
log p(D|Md) = log p(D|θˆ,Md)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maximized likelihood
+ (−λd) log n+ (md − 1) log log n+Op (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Occam factor
,
(31)
which involves the penalty
penOccam(Md) = λd log n− (md − 1) log log n.
Under relatively mild conditions (see Watanabe, 2009, Theorem 7.2), it can be
shown that the learning coefficient will be a rational number in [0,dim(Θd)/2],
with multiplicity in {1, ...,dim Θdmax}. Therefore, for singular models, the auto-
matic penalty entangled with Bayesian model selection will be smaller than the
regular BIC penalty
penBIC(Md) =
dim Θd
2
log n.
This fact has two interpretations:
• For complex models, the number of parameters gives poor insight on the
behavior of Bayesian Occam’s razor. A phenomenon studied notably by
Rasmussen and Ghahramani (2001).
• Singular models will benefit from their smaller penalties to have poten-
tially larger marginal likelihoods than regular models. Following Germain
et al. (2016), let us consider the marginal likelihood as an indicator of
predictive performance. In this framework, singular models that fit the
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data well may therefore have stronger generalization power than regular
models in the asymptotic regime. In other words, singular models may be
less prone to overfitting.
The recent empirical successes of deep neural networks constitute perhaps an in-
teresting instance of this phenomenon. In their most common form, deep neural
networks (LeCun et al., 2015; Goodfellow et al., 2016) are models for supervised
learning involving a predictor of the form
F (x) = σ1 ◦ f1 ◦ σ2 ◦ f2 ◦ ... ◦ fM (x), (32)
where σ1, ..., σM are simple nonlinear pointwise functions chosen beforehand,
and f1, ..., fM are learnt affine functions. Empirical evidence strongly suggests
that, if the number of observations is very large, using an important number
M of layers leads to better generalization performance—state-of-the-art visual
recognition systems usually involve hundreds of layers (He et al., 2016). How-
ever, this hypothesis still has little theoretical foundation, and the generaliza-
tion prowesses of deep neural networks remain largely mysterious (Zhang et al.,
2017). Asymptotic Bayesian model uncertainty provides a heuristic interpreta-
tion. While a one-layer network is a regular model, as the number of layers
grows, networks become less and less identifiable. Specifically, the Hessian ma-
trix of the log-likelihood of deep networks appears to have many null eigenvalues
(Sagun et al., 2018), and at a given number of parameters, deeper networks have
fewer degrees of freedom in Ye’s (1998) sense (Gao and Jojic, 2016). It appears
therefore reasonable to conjecture that the learning coefficient shrinks when the
number of layers grows. If this is true, then, for a given number of parameters,
a deeper network will have a higher marginal likelihood provided that there is
enough data. This perspective, closely related to the recent findings of Smith
and Le (2018), may explain why deep learning resists much more efficiently to
overfitting than other more traditional techniques.
Example: BIC versus sBIC for reduced-rank regression Consider the
reduced-rank regression framework, as described by Drton and Plummer (2017).
The problem is to linearly predict a multivariate response using some covari-
ate. Each model corresponds to assigning a rank constraint on the regression
matrix parameter. Since prediction is the objective, it would appear natural
to perform BMA. Given a new covariate value, the BMA estimate of the re-
sponse is a weighted average of the posterior means obtained for each model.
The weights are posterior model probabilities, but are often replaced by BIC-
based approximations (Hoeting et al., 1999). However, since this is a singular
case, sBIC approximations may be more sensible. To empirically check if this
is true, we use three real data sets: “eyedata” (Scheetz et al., 2006), “feedstock”
(Liebmann et al., 2009) and “vélibs” (Bouveyron et al., 2015). To obtain mul-
tivariate regression problems, the following preprocessing step was used. The
variables were ranked according to the unsupervised feature selection technique
of Bouveyron et al. (2018). The first 20 variables were considered as response
and the 30 last were considered as covariates. The data are then split equally
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between training and test set and the performance is assessed (Table 1) using
the mean-squared error (MSE). Five estimators are considered: the ordinary
least-squares estimator (OLSE) obtained with the full model, OLSEs obtained
with models selected by BIC and sBIC, and two BMA estimators. The sBIC-
based BMA estimator outperforms all other competitors, illustrating that sBIC
provides a more reliable proxy for posterior probabilities than does BIC.
4.4. Approximate methods for high-dimensional and implicit models
The last decades have brought about wilder and wilder statistical models. In
this subsection, we focus on two kinds of models for which Bayesian model
uncertainty is particularly challenging, and has witnessed important advances
in recent years: implicit models and high-dimensional models.
4.4.1. Handling implicit models with likelihood-free inference
The models that have been studied so far are explicit in the sense that, given
a parameter value, we have full access to a candidate distribution with density
p(·|θ,Md) over the data space, leading to the computation of the likelihood
function θ 7→ p(D|θ,Md) which plays a major role within the Bayesian ma-
chinery. However, more and more attention is devoted to families of models for
which the likelihood function is not available. This context arises when, given
a parameter θ, rather than knowing the corresponding candidate distribution
p(·|θ,Md), we are merely able to simulate data from p(·|θ,Md). Often, the non-
availability of the likelihood comes from the presence of a latent variable that is
difficult to integrate. This is for instance the case of popular population genetics
models which involve unobserved genealogical histories (see e.g. Tavaré et al.,
1997). Other examples include Markov random fields and related models (see
e.g. Stoehr, 2017, for a recent review). While the likelihood is extremely hard
to compute in these contexts, it also sometimes does not exist whatsoever. This
occurs when dealing with generative adversarial networks (GANs, Goodfellow
et al., 2014), deep learning models that have vastly improved the state-of-the-art
in pseudonatural image generation. GANs essentially assume that the data is
generated by passing noise through a neural network parametrized by θ. In this
case, while it is easy to sample from the distribution of D|(θ,Md), this distri-
bution has no density (Arjovsky and Bottou, 2017), which makes the likelihood
not only intractable, but nonexistent.
Table 1
BIC versus sBIC for reduced-rank regression: MSE over 1000 replications.
OLSE BIC sBIC BMA-BIC BMA-sBIC
eyedata 10.8 (1.07) 8.67 (0.536) 8.67 (0.541) 8.67 (0.536) 8.60 (0.584)
feedstock 10.5 (1.72) 10.5 (1.53) 9.79 (1.42) 10.4 (1.52) 9.79 (1.42)
vélibs 14.9 (0.980) 16.5 (0.672) 14.7 (0.624) 16.4 (0.694) 14.5 (0.612)
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General-purpose inference within implicit models has been subject to much
attention, dating at least back to Diggle and Gratton (1984). From a Bayesian
perspective, the first important contribution came from population genetics with
the seminal paper of Tavaré et al. (1997), who proposed a scheme for drawing
samples from an approximation of the posterior distribution. The fruitful line of
work that followed (see e.g. Csilléry et al., 2010, for a review of applications and
Marin et al., 2012, for a methodological overview) has been called approximate
Bayesian computation (ABC). While parameter inference in implicit models is
already extremely challenging, recent efforts have also been concentrated to-
wards accounting for model uncertainty. Model-specific methodologies has led
to efficient schemes for estimating the marginal likelihood in several frameworks,
such as exponential random graph models (Friel, 2013; Bouranis et al., 2017).
In a more general setting, several techniques have been proposed to estimate
posterior model probabilities using the ABC rationale (see e.g. Marin et al.,
2018, for a review). In particular, Pudlo et al. (2015) proposed a scalable ap-
proach based on Breiman’s (2001) random forests. Several papers have also
tried to apply variational inference to general implicit models (Huszár, 2017;
Tran et al., 2017a,b). Althought model uncertainty was not the primary focus
of these works, such variational approaches lead to the computation of lower-
bounds of the marginal likelihood (see next subsection), and can be therefore
used to approximate posterior model probabilities.
4.4.2. Handling high-dimensional models with large-scale deterministic
inference
Families of high-dimensional models combine two major difficulties when ac-
counting for model uncertainty:
1. The marginal likelihood of a high-dimensional model Md, as a dim Θd-
dimensional integral, might be extremely difficult to compute, especially
using MCMC methods.
2. Sparse modelling, which is extremely popular in high-dimensional settings
because it can lead to increased interpretability and better performance,
usually involves a number of candidate models of order 2p, where p is the
(large) total number of variables. In this setting, it appears impossible to
compute posterior probabilities of all models within the family.
We choose to focus here specifically on sparsity, which has arguably constituted
the most popular field of statistical research of the last two decades, culminating
perhaps with the monograph of Hastie et al. (2015) and Candès’s (2014) plenary
lecture at the International Congress of Mathematicians.
In a sparse modelling context, there is a largest model M with parameter
space Θ within which all other models are embedded. A convenient way to write
models in this context in through the use of binary vectors v ∈ {0, 1}dim Θ that
can index each modelMv, such that
Θv = {θ ∈ Θ|Supp(θ) = v}. (33)
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Accounting for model uncertainty now all comes down to studying the posterior
distribution of this high-dimensional binary vector v, and model selection can
be recast as the following discrete optimization problem
v∗ ∈ argmaxvp(v|D), with v ∈ {0, 1}dim Θ. (34)
Of course, so far, the problem remains exactly as difficult as before, and both
the exact posterior of v and the best model v∗ remain very difficult to com-
pute because of the large number of models. However, using this formalism, we
can now make use of the particular structure of the model space {0, 1}dim Θ
to efficiently approximate these quantities. There are several ways of building
on this structural knowledge to perform approximate but fast model selection.
We review here two particularly efficient ones: variational approximations and
continuous relaxations.
First, although knowing the exact posterior distribution of v would require
estimating a prohibiting (2p − 1)-dimensional parameter, we can use the bi-
nary vector structure to derive a computationally cheaper approximation of the
posterior. Specifically, we can consider a mean-field approximation qρ(v) of the
posterior that factorizes as a product of Bernoulli distributions with parameters
ρ = (ρ1, ..., ρp):
p(v|D) ≈ qρ(v) =
p∏
i=1
qρi(vi) =
p∏
i=1
B(vi|ρi). (35)
Knowing this approximate posterior distribution conveniently requires to deter-
mine only a p-dimensional parameter. To insure that the approximation is close
to the true posterior, variational inference minimizes the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence between qρ(v) and p(v|D). This is equivalent to maximizing a quantity
known as the evidence lower bound (ELBO)
ELBO(ρ) = Ev∼qρ [log p(D,v)] + H(qρ), (36)
with respect to ρ. With this approximation, the very challenging computation
of all 2p posterior probabilities has been recast as a much simpler continuous
p-dimensional optimization problem. This idea has been successfully applied
to sparse high-dimensional linear and logistic regression (Logsdon et al., 2010;
Carbonetto and Stephens, 2012; Huang et al., 2016). A similar approach, based
on a related variational setting called expectation propagation (Minka, 2001), was
also used for group-sparse regression (Hernández-Lobato et al., 2013). For more
details on variational inference in general, and notably on optimization strategies
for the ELBO, see Bishop (2007, Chapter 10) and Blei et al. (2017). Beyond the
Kullback-Leibler divergence, other divergences have been recently considered for
variational inference, such as Rényi’s α-divergences (Hernández-Lobato et al.,
2016; Li and Turner, 2016) or the χ-divergence (Dieng et al., 2017). It is worth
mentioning that assessing the quality of the variational approximation qρ(v)
is not an easy task. A way of doing so via importance sampling was recently
proposed by Yao et al. (2018).
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While variational inference provides a scalable way of tackling the variable
selection problem, the mean-field assumption, which states that variable rele-
vances are independent a posteriori, appears quite restrictive, especially when
features are very correlated. Another more direct approach to transform the
discrete optimization problem into a continuous one is trough making a con-
tinuous relaxation and replacing the condition v ∈ {0, 1}dim Θ by a continuous
constraint v ∈ V ⊂ Rp. Using the parameter set V = Rp+ was the first pro-
posal in that line of work. Introduced in the context of feed-forward neural
networks by MacKay (1994) and Neal (1996) as automatic relevance determi-
nation (ARD), it led to efficient and sparse high dimensional learning in several
contexts, including kernel machines (Tipping, 2001). Although the original mo-
tivation for ARD was mostly heuristic, similarly to the lasso, good theoretical
properties were discovered later on (Wipf and Nagarajan, 2008; Wipf et al.,
2011). An approach closer to traditional model selection is the one of Latouche
et al. (2016), who used the ARD-like relaxation V = [0, 1]p to determine a small
subfamily of models over which the marginal likelihood is eventually discretely
optimized. The key advantage of this technique is that while it has the scalabil-
ity of both the variational approaches and ARD, it still performs exact Bayesian
model selection at the end, the only approximation being the fact that only a
small subfamily is considered. Beyond supervised problems, such continuous re-
laxations have also been used to solve high-dimensional sparse PCA problems
(Archambeau and Bach, 2009; Bouveyron et al., 2018).
The ELBO as an approximation of the marginal likelihood We have
seen that the ELBO appears naturally if one wants to approximate a complex
posterior using a parametric surrogate that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence. But, as its name suggests, the ELBO also bounds the marginal like-
lihood (or evidence) and can therefore be seen as an approximation of it. This
leads to an approximate procedure to compute posterior model probabilities,
which has proven useful in many contexts involving complex posteriors, such
as hidden Markov models (Watanabe et al., 2003), Gaussian mixture mod-
els (Bishop, 2007, Section 10.2.4) or stochastic block models (Latouche et al.,
2012, 2014). As a non-asymptotic approximation, the ELBO usually compares
favourably in small-sample scenarios with the Laplace-like approximations de-
scribed in Section 4.3.1. Moreover, the quality of this approximation may be
assessed by also computing upper bounds of the marginal likelihood, as sug-
gested by Dieng et al. (2017).
5. Conclusion
Bayesian model uncertainty provides a systematized approach of many of the
challenges modern statistics has to face: a large number of variables, a poten-
tially low number of observations, and an ever-growing toolset of new statistical
models. As a concluding and temperating note, it is worth reminding and em-
phasizing that the paradigm of model uncertainty presented in this review has
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also been subject to much criticism. A philosophical overview of frequentist ob-
jections to Bayesian model uncertainty can be found in the thought-provoking
monograph of Mayo (2018). Even within the Bayesian community, several lines
of work have criticized Jeffreys’s framework, both from foundational (e.g. Gel-
man and Shalizi, 2013) and technical (e.g. Robert, 2016) grounds, leading to
alternative paradigms for model uncertainty. Interesting examples of such ap-
proaches include the mixture framework of Kamary et al. (2014) or methods
based on proper scoring rules (Dawid and Musio, 2015; Shao et al., 2018). We
believe that such constructive criticism is vital for Bayesian model uncertainty
to tackle the challenges offered by modern data. In particular, being able to
diagnose cases where all models are irrelevant is not possible using model un-
certainty, but is precisely the point of the model criticism advocated by Gelman
and Shalizi (2013). We think that it will be customary in the future to combine
model uncertainty with model criticism, in order to design these “sophisticatedly
simple models” described and desired by Zellner (2001).
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Appendix A. Data and software
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for predicting ozone concentration
Bayesian linear regression models of Figure 1 were fit using the bas R package
(Clyde, 2018). Code is available at https://github.com/pamattei/ozone.
Is BMA useful for linear regression?
The data sets used for the BMA experiment of Figure 2 are taken from various
R packages that are listed in the code, at https://github.com/pamattei/PAC.
BIC versus sBIC for reduced-rank regression
These results presented in Table 1 were previously published in my discussion on
the paper by Drton and Plummer (2017). Code for this experiment is available
at https://github.com/pamattei/BMAsBIC.
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